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ESSAY
UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISES UNDER RFRA:
EXPLAINING THE OUTLIERS IN THE HHS MANDATE CASES
Mark L. Rienzi*
O NGOING conflict over the contraceptive mandate promulgatedby the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") has
resulted in more than two dozen lawsuits by profit-making busi-
nesses and their owners seeking protection under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). To date, the businesses and
their owners are winning handily, having obtained preliminary re-
lief in seventeen of the cases, and being denied relief in only six.1
Last month, in fact, a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took
the extraordinary step of reconsidering and reversing its own prior
ruling and granting a preliminary injunction to a business seeking
RFRA's protection. 2
The analysis in these cases is turning largely on whether courts
find that the HHS mandate imposes a "substantial burden" under
RFRA. RFRA prohibits the government from imposing a "substantial
burden" on a person's religious exercise unless the government
*Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; Senior Counsel, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. Through his work at the
Becket Fund, Professor Rienzi represents several parties challenging the HHS mandate,
including Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
' An updated tally of the for-profit cases is maintained here: HHS Mandate Infor-
mation Central, The Becket Fund, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
2 See Gilardi v. HHS, No. 13-5069 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2013) (order granting prelimi-
nary injunction), available at http://c0391070.cdn2.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/
pdf/order-granting-injunction-pending-appeal.pdf.
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proves that imposing the burden is the least restrictive means of ad-
vancing a compelling government interest.3 To date, every court to
find a substantial burden has entered a preliminary injunction.
Thus, determining whether or not the mandate imposes a "substan-
tial burden" is crucial to the outcome of these cases.
Why have six courts denied relief while most other judges have
granted it? One part of the answer is that these courts have wrongly
concluded that religious liberty rights disappear when an organiza-
tion earns profits-an error I have discussed at length elsewhere.4
This essay will explore a second error made by these outlier
courts in applying RFRA's "substantial burden" test. Properly under-
stood, RFRA's "substantial burden" analysis examines whether the
government is coercing a believer to abandon a religious exercise
(i.e., religiously-motivated conduct or abstention from conduct).
Once sincerity of the religious motivation is established-an issue
the government has not been contesting in the mandate cases-the
underlying religious reasons for the religious exercise should be en-
tirely irrelevant.
The few courts denying relief in the HHS mandate context, how-
ever, have failed to treat the government coercion as the focus of
their substantial burden analysis. Instead, they have viewed the
substantial burden analysis as an occasion for examining the reli-
gious reasons supporting the religious exercise. In so doing, these
courts have denied relief based on their conclusion that a religious
exercise supported by a particular kind of religious belief-namely a
religious requirement to avoid facilitating someone else's wrongful
action-is ineligible for RFRA's protection.
This type of analysis is wrong. Once a sincere religious exercise is
established, the only appropriate question for the substantial bur-
den inquiry is whether the government is coercing the believer to
give up that exercise. RFRA leaves no room for judicially-created ex-
ceptions whereby courts grant or withhold the law's protections
based on their own appraisal of the particular type of religious belief
prompting a religious exercise.
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
4 See Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Money-
Makers?, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. (forthcoming fall 2013), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2229632.
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I. RFRA's NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISES
Imagine two religious believers who are denied unemployment
benefits because they refuse to work at a syringe-making factory.
One religious believer refuses the job because her faith teaches that
all modern medicine is evil and that she cannot be involved in mak-
ing syringes. A second religious believer of a different faith refuses
the job because she is religiously opposed to capital punishment.
This second believer's faith teaches that she cannot be involved in
making syringes because some number of the syringes may eventu-
ally be used, after later and independent choices by other people, in
lethal injections.
As a normative matter, religious freedom law should treat both re-
ligious objectors in the same way. Both are engaged in the exact
same religious exercise-refusing to work in the syringe factory.
And both face the exact same government pressure to forego that
exercise-denial of unemployment benefits. Whether the denial of
unemployment benefits constitutes a "substantial burden" on the re-
ligious exercise of refusing the job should be analyzed the same way
for both believers.
To be sure, there are religious differences about the believers' re-
ligious reasons for turning down the job. The first believer's religion
teaches that working in a syringe factory is intrinsically wrong,
while the second believer's religion teaches that such work is wrong
for a more indirect reason, namely because it may facilitate another
person's later wrongful act (an execution). But these differences
concern questions of underlying religious and theological motiva-
tions-topics that are beyond the competence of civil courts. Partic-
ularly in our religiously diverse society, it is no business of the gov-
ernment's to discriminate among believers engaged in the same
religious exercise and to judge some religious reasons good enough
for protection and others not. Rather, religious freedom law should
simply look to see if the behavior at issue is a sincere religious exer-
cise, and ask whether the government has coerced the believer to
give up that exercise.
As a matter of positive law, this nondiscriminatory treatment of
different religious beliefs is exactly what RFRA's substantial burden
inquiry requires. After the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
[Vol. 99:112
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Division v. Smith,5 RFRA was enacted by Congress with the express
goal of "restor[ing] the compelling interest test as set forth in Sher-
bert v. Verner ... and Wisconsin v. Yoder."6 Congress sought to "guar-
antee" application of that test "in all cases" where religious exercise
is substantially burdened.7 The statutory text does not discriminate
based on the underlying theological reasons for a religious exercise
at all. Rather, it applies the same standards "in all cases" and to "any
exercise of religion" regardless of whether that exercise "is com-
pelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."8 The proper
question for the courts is not why the believer engages in a particu-
lar religious exercise, but whether the government is coercing the
believer to cease that exercise.
The Sherbert line of cases adopted by RFRA confirms this reading.
Sherbert concerned a Seventh Day Adventist, Adell Sherbert, whose
religious exercise consisted of abstaining from work on Saturdays,
resulting in a denial of unemployment benefits.9 The government
argued that it had not imposed a "substantial burden" on her reli-
gious exercise because it had not criminalized "the holding of any
religious belief or opinion" or "force[d] or coerce[d] any person to
embrace a particular religious belief."10 In other words, the govern-
ment focused its argument on the underlying religious beliefs that
motivated Ms. Sherbert's religious exercise, and argued there was
no burden because it left those beliefs untouched.
The Court rejected this approach, focusing instead on the reli-
gious conduct itself (abstaining from Saturday work) and on the
presence or absence of government coercion to give up that exer-
cise. The Court noted that the government's denial of unemploy-
ment benefits created a "pressure upon her to forego" her religious
exercise that was "unmistakable."11 Whether a substantial burden
on religious exercise existed was determined not by focusing on the
S 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citing 374 U.S. 398 (1963); 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
7 Id.
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
9 374 U.S. 398, 399-401 (1963).
10 Brief for the Respondents at 12, Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (No. 526).
11Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 ("The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of reli-
gion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.").
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believer's underlying religious beliefs (which were left intact by the
law), but by asking, simply, whether the government had pressured
her to give up her religiously-motivated conduct.
The Court conducted a similar analysis when it applied Sherbert
in Thomas v. Review Board.12 Thomas concerned a Jehovah's Witness
who resigned his job in a steel foundry when the only available
work involved producing tank turrets.13 Thomas's religious beliefs
prohibited him not only from personally fighting in a war, but also
from facilitating someone else fighting by making the tanks that
might later be used in war.14 The Court again rejected a belief-
focused approach to the burden inquiry, and instead focused on the
presence or absence of government coercion to give up the conduct
in question. The Court admonished that courts "should not under-
take to dissect religious beliefs"is and that whether a religious exer-
cise is protected "is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the par-
ticular belief or practice in question."16 Instead, the reviewing
court's "narrow function" is to look for government coercion that
"put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify" a sincere re-
ligious exercise, regardless of the precise religious lines drawn by
the believer.17 Again, the Court's analysis shows that the burden in-
quiry focuses on government coercion to give up a sincere religious
exercise, and does not countenance an inquiry into the believer's
theological reasons for his conduct.
Given Congress's express adoption of the Sherbert line of cases in
RFRA, it is perhaps not surprising that the courts of appeal have in-
terpreted the "substantial burden" inquiry like the Court applied it
in Sherbert and Thomas: with the focus of the inquiry squarely on
the presence or absence of government coercion. Thus the courts of
appeal generally find a substantial burden whenever the govern-
ment "places substantial pressure on an adherent" to give up a reli-
gious exercise.18 Other than requiring that the exercise be motivated
12 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
13 Id. at 709.
14 Id.
Is Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 714 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 716-18; see also id. at 715 ("Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say
that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.").
18 See, e.g., Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010); Washing-
ton v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting a substantial burden exists,
among other situations, where "the government puts substantial pressure on an adher-
[Vol. 99:114
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by a sincere religious belief, the substantial burden analysis is exclu-
sively about government coercion, and does not vary based on the
particular theological reasons for the believer's religious exercise.
II. UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISES IN OUTLIER HHS MANDATE
CASES
The handful of courts to deny protection in the HHS mandate con-
text erred in part because they failed to apply these core principles.
In the mandate context, a proper substantial burden inquiry should
be quite easy. The religious exercise in question is the plaintiffs' re-
ligiously-motivated practice of excluding certain drugs and devices
from their insurance policies. The mandate threatens very large
fines-thousands or even millions of dollars per day-if the plain-
tiffs continue to engage in that exercise. By any light, such direct
fines for engaging in a religious exercise are a substantial burden on
that exercise, and trigger RFRA's strict scrutiny.
The outlier courts, however, found that there was no substantial
burden in part because they viewed religious exercises prompted by
a particular type of religious belief-a religious requirement to
avoid facilitating someone else's wrongful conduct-to be ineligible
for RFRA's protection. For example, one court denying relief deter-
mined that the "core" theological reason behind the plaintiffs' reli-
gious exercise of excluding certain drugs and devices from its health
plan was "the effect of particular contraceptives on a fertilized
egg."19 Having discerned this "core," the court then focused not on
whether the government was pressuring the plaintiffs to give up the
religious exercise, but on the fact that employees would make a later
choice to take, or not take, the drugs in question. 20 The court found
that forcing the plaintiffs to violate their religion and provide the in-
surance to pay for these drugs did not burden plaintiffs' religious
exercise because they themselves "remain free to make their own
ent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs."); Lovelace v. Lee,
472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[A] substantial burden [is one that] 'put[s] substan-
tial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs .... " (cit-
ing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718)); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[A]
government action or regulation creates a 'substantial burden' on a religious exercise if
it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and signif-
icantly violate his religious beliefs.").
19 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4449, at *44-45 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 11, 2013).
20 Id. at *45.
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independent decisions about their use or non-use of different forms
of contraception."21 Other courts similarly found that a religious ex-
ercise motivated by a religious obligation to separate oneself from
"a series of independent decisions by health care providers and pa-
tients" was "indirect and attenuated" and therefore "unlikely to es-
tablish" a substantial burden.22
These courts were correct about the plaintiffs' underlying reli-
gious reason for the religious exercise of excluding certain drugs
from their insurance policies: these plaintiffs stated a religious obli-
gation not to facilitate someone's decision to kill a newly-formed
human life. But the courts were wrong to believe that RFRA protec-
tion is unavailable for exercises based on religious obligations to
avoid facilitating someone else's actions. For the reasons set forth
above, RFRA's protection turns not on a judicial assessment of the
particular theological reasoning behind a believer's religious exer-
cise, but on whether the government is coercing the believer to stop.
The proper RFRA analysis-and indeed the type of analysis re-
quired by governing caselaw in the relevant circuits-simply re-
quired the courts to ask whether the government was forcing the
plaintiffs to give up a religious exercise. Whether the believers en-
gaged in that exercise because their religion deems all insurance
sinful-a belief the Affordable Care Act actually protects else-
where23-or because their religion requires them to avoid even less
direct involvements with what the religion regards as wrongful
conduct of others, the analysis should have been exactly the same.
In sum, RFRA requires the same standard to be applied "in all
cases" and to "any religious exercise." Judicial discrimination be-
tween and among different religious reasons for a religious exercise
is both unsupported by the law and unsuited to our religiously di-
verse society, where people of many different faiths engage in reli-
gious exercises for many different reasons. Had the outlier courts
adhered to these basic principles, they would have correctly found
21 Id. at *28.
22 Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 870 F.Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (W.D. Okla. 2012); see also
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *7 (W.D. Mich.,
Dec. 24, 2012) (noting that "independent decisions of the employee and the employee's
healthcare provider" are "standing between" the religious objector and contraceptive
use).
23See 26 U.S.C.A § 5000A(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2011); 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (2006)
(noting an exemption for those "conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits
of any private or public insurance").
[Vol. 99:116
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that the mandate imposes a substantial burden on religious objec-
tors, and would then have analyzed whether the government can
demonstrate a compelling interest and narrow tailoring in imposing
that burden.
